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OPINION OF THE COURT

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
After a $185 million settlement in this securities class action, lead counsel
requested $36.6 million in attorneys’ fees. The District Court approved the request
despite the objections of class member Rita Carfagna, who now appeals. For the reasons
that follow, we will affirm.
I.
In July 2000, a number of class action suits against Bristol-Myers Squibb were
consolidated. Amalgamated Bank, as trustee of LongView Collective Investment Fund,
was named the lead plaintiff, and Labaton Sucharow & Rudoff LLP was named lead
counsel. In an August 2000 consolidated complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Bristol-Myers
and its senior officers made knowingly false statements about the safety and sales
prospects of a new drug, ultimately leading to a significant drop in the price of BristolMyers’s shares. An amended complaint in May 2002 made similar claims about BristolMyers’s statements and omissions regarding two subsequent clinical trials of the drug.1
In June 2003, lead counsel signed an attorneys’ fee arrangement with lead plaintiff.
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Plaintiffs also filed a second amended complaint in August 2005, which simply
conformed the allegations to the District Court’s partial grant of summary judgment.
2

It provided that lead counsel would receive a certain percentage of any class award
depending on the stage at which settlement or judgment occurred and the amount of the
award. In February 2006, the parties reached a settlement, pursuant to which BristolMyers would pay the class $185 million and enact significant corporate governance
reform. Following its approval of the settlement, lead plaintiff granted lead counsel’s
request to set aside the original fee arrangement and instead seek up to 20% of the
settlement fund from the District Court. A settlement notice was then mailed to the class;
it indicated that lead counsel would seek fees of up to 20% of the fund, but it did not
disclose the original fee agreement.
Lead counsel then asked the District Court to approve fees of $36.6 million
(19.77% of the fund), which represented the lodestar.2 This was $14.7 million more than
counsel would have received under the original fee arrangement. At a hearing before the
District Court, class member Rita Carfagna objected to the fees on several grounds. The
Court, however, approved the fee request after concluding that counsel had “earned every
penny that they’ve sought.” App. 1188.
We have jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District
Court’s approval of fees for abuse of discretion. Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223
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“Lodestar” is defined as “[a] reasonable amount of attorney’s fees in a given
case, usu. calculated by multiplying a reasonable number of hours worked by the
prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work, and often considering such
additional factors as the degree of skill and difficulty involved in the case, the degree of
its urgency, its novelty, and the like.” Black’s Law Dictionary 960 (8th ed. 2004).
3

F.3d 190, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2000).
II.
A.
This is a common fund case, in which the attorneys’ fees and class award come
from the same source. In other words, “every additional dollar given to class counsel
means one less dollar for the class, regardless how a total settlement package is formally
structured.” In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 256 (3d Cir. 2001). Among the
factors that district courts should consider when deciding whether to approve attorneys’
fees in a common fund case are:
(1) the size of the fund created and the number of persons benefitted; (2) the
presence or absence of substantial objections by members of the class to the
settlement terms and/or fees requested by counsel; (3) the skill and
efficiency of the attorneys involved; (4) the complexity and duration of the
litigation; (5) the risk of nonpayment; (6) the amount of time devoted to the
case by plaintiffs’ counsel; and (7) the awards in similar cases.
Gunter, 223 F.3d at 195 n.1.
Carfagna argues that lead counsel should have been bound by its original
agreement with lead plaintiff. She notes that lead counsel is very experienced and that it
entered into the original fee arrangement almost three years after the litigation began.
Carfagna, however, has failed to explain why the District Court’s approval of $36.6
million in attorneys’ fees was an abuse of discretion. In fact, the Court carefully
reviewed all the relevant factors and specifically considered the existence of the previous
fee arrangement. The Court observed that counsel took on “extraordinarily substantial
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risks”; the settlement fund was “very large” for the type of securities fraud claimed;
counsel was skilled and efficient; the litigation was long and complex, requiring an
“extraordinary” devotion of time; the attorneys’ fee award, as a percentage of the
settlement fund, was on the “low end” as compared to similar cases; and it would be bad
policy to award less than the lodestar when counsel performed so well. App. 1188-94. In
light of these considerations, as well as lead plaintiff’s approval of the fee request, we
cannot say the District Court abused its discretion.3
B.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(B), district courts “must direct
notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by a proposed
settlement.” We have explained that “Rule 23(e) notice is designed to summarize the
litigation and the settlement and to apprise class members of the right and opportunity to
inspect the complete settlement documents, papers, and pleadings filed in the litigation.”
In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 283, 327 (3d Cir. 1998). Without citing to any case
law, Carfagna argues that the failure to disclose the original fee arrangement in the
settlement notice was a material omission rendering the notice inadequate. She also
contends that more class members would have objected had they known of the original
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Carfagna also argues that lead plaintiff’s attorneys failed to provide sufficiently
detailed summaries of their work on the case. She does not, however, make any specific
allegations that the attorneys inflated their hours. And although she cites the billing
summary of Martis Alex, which does contain only minimal information, she fails to note
that he also submitted a separate affidavit detailing his firm’s work on the case. See App.
798-801.
5

fee arrangement.
We believe that it would have been preferable for lead counsel to disclose the
original fee arrangement in the notice. Nevertheless, the notice properly summarized the
litigation and settlement, and it indicated that counsel would be seeking fees of up to 20%
of the settlement fund. The notice, therefore, was directed “in a reasonable manner” and
provided class members with sufficient information.
Carfagna also claims the settlement notice was misleading with respect to the
percentage of fees and expenses that would be requested. One sentence of the notice
states that lead counsel “intends to apply for an award for fees and expenses not to exceed
20% of the Settlement Fund.” App. 514 ¶ 54. In fact, as Carfagna notes, lead counsel
sought $36.6 million in fees and $3.6 million in expenses, which together constitute
21.7% of the settlement fund. Lead counsel concedes that the inclusion of the word
“expenses” was an unfortunate error, but it notes that two other paragraphs of the notice
state clearly that expenses will be in addition to the 20% in fees. See App. 505 ¶ 4; App.
508 ¶ 19. We believe that class members who read the full notice understood that lead
counsel would seek reimbursement for expenses in addition to the 20% in fees. Certainly,
it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to approve the fee request despite
this one mistake in the notice.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s decision to
approve lead counsel’s request for $36.6 million in attorneys’ fees.
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